European Union
The Commission Recommendation of 11 April 2024 set out a coordinated approach to the PQC transition. The coordinated roadmap of June 2025 turned this into milestones: start by end of 2026, high-risk use cases by end of 2030, as many systems as feasible by 2035.
NIS2 requires state-of-the-art security and risk management, which increasingly includes quantum risk. The CER directive adds resilience obligations for critical entities.
European Commission: Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101 · EU PQC roadmap (June 2025)
Netherlands
AIVD, NCSC, TNO and CWI published the PQC-migratiehandboek. The AIVD and NCSC guide Maak je organisatie quantumveilig helps CIOs, CTOs and CISOs with risk analysis, an inventory of crypto assets, risk assessment, a migration plan and "no-regret" measures. According to that guide, experts expect quantum computers able to break widely used cryptography likely between 2030 and 2040.
The Wwke, the Dutch implementation of the CER directive, applies to organisations designated by the NCTV.
Staatsblad 2026, 188 · NCTV: organisations designated under the Wwke
United States
NIST's FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) are the reference standards worldwide. NIST's transition guidance, IR 8547 (draft), proposes deprecating quantum-vulnerable algorithms such as RSA and ECC by 2030 and disallowing them by 2035.
NIST: first 3 finalized post-quantum encryption standards
International
The G7 Cybersecurity Working Group calls the quantum threat a near-term risk for every sector, not just critical infrastructure. It frames the transition as a collective effort that needs early, coordinated planning across the public and private sectors.
Europol and UC3M examined "harvest now, decrypt later": encrypted data intercepted today can be decrypted once a quantum computer is available, which puts long-lived sensitive data at risk already.
G7: Call to Action · Europol: Harvest now, decrypt later